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Abstract 
 
This paper examines the challenges for peace and independence of a Muslim 
Bangsamoro1 group of the southern Philippines namely the Moro National Liberation 
Front (MNLF) and examines the social and political changes occurring in Mindanao 
and the Sulu Archipelago. The paper will give a brief history of Islam in the Philippines 
then chronologically trace the formation of the MNLF. Important to the thesis of the 
paper will be the eras before and after 1996, necessary, because this was the year that 
the MNLF and the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) signed an 
historic Peace Agreement. And the paper will attempt to explain why the MNLF has 
been largely ignored in the peace processes of the 21st Century, and why the GRP is 
reluctant to negotiate with them with the same enthusiasm as they are doing with the 
Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF).  The paper will conclude with a prediction as to 
the future of the MNLF. 
 
 
Research Methodology: 
 
 
This paper was researched using data drawn from primary and secondary sources. 
This included text analysis, statistical data such as the National Statistics Office Manila, 
observations including foreign analysis such as the United States Institute of Peace 
(USIP) ethnographic studies, personal communication2, and access to, evaluation and 
participation in various Muslim Bangsamoro web-sites and forums such as 
Luwaran.com. 
 
 
Literature Review: 
 
 
Much has been written about the Muslim Bangsamoro struggle for self-determination in 
the southern Philippines however very little or anything has dealt entirely with the 
MNLF. Most publications prefer to include the MNLF as just another Muslim 
organisation striving for identity or concerned solely with the aspirations of its 
members. In 1990 W. K. Che Man published The Moros of Southern Philippines and 
the Malays of Southern Thailand.  The importance of this publication lay in its historical 
analysis of the “birth” of the Bangsamoro organised resistance in the early 1970s, 
which included the formation of the MNLF and the entry of the Organization of Islamic 
Conference (OIC) into the debate.  
 
Professor of Anthropology at the University of Alabama, Thomas McKenna, in 1998 
published Rulers and Rebels: Everyday Politics and Armed Separatism in the Southern 
                                                 
1 The word Bangsamoro is now widely used to describe all original ethnic people of the Philippines. 
However because this paper is predominately about the Muslim population of the southern Philippines, 
Muslim Bangsamoro will be used to identify the group researched.   
 
2 The author is in constant contact with key players in the southern Philippines peace process, including 
the Executive Director of the USIP.    
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Philippine. McKenna saw the Muslim Bangsamoro struggle in the frame of 
ethnonationalism, and he also saw poverty and underdevelopment as the underlying 
cause for the Muslim Bangsamoro agitation. Authors Eric Gutierrez and Saturnino 
Borras Jr. in their 2004 publication The Moro Conflict: Landlessness and Misdirected 
State Policies agreed with McKenna’s sentiments. However the MNLF, although the 
original Muslim Bangsamoro group is overlooked in importance by the authors in favour 
of the more contemporary Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). 
     
In 2000 Danguilan Vita Marites and Glenda Gloria published Under the Crescent Moon: 
Rebellion in Mindanao. The organisational structure of the MNLF and MILF was 
meticulously researched. The MILF was given more prominence than the MNLF 
although the MNLF was the only Muslim Bangsamoro organisation to have signed a 
peace agreement with the Government of the Republic of the Philippines.  
 
The 2001 publication by former Philippine President Fidel Ramos, The Continuing 
Revolution: Meeting the Challenges of Development and Poverty Reduction, recalls the 
signing of the 1996 Peace Agreement with the MNLF and the favourably response by 
the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC). This publication by Ramos puts into 
perspective the importance of the MNLF. A point missed by successive Philippine 
Administrations. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
The term Bangsamoro is the generic name for the thirteen ethnolinguistic Muslim tribes 
of the southern Philippines. The thirteen groups are Sama, Badjao Tausug, Yakan,  
Maranao, Maguindanao, Iranun, Kalibugan, Kalagan, Sangil, Palawani, Molbog, and 
Jamamapun. In the 2000 Philippine census, Islam was given as the religious affiliation 
by 20.44% of the population of Mindanao, all in all approximately 3.7 million persons 
(National Statistics Office Manila, Philippines). The map below indicates those 
provinces of the southern Philippines which accommodate a Muslim ethnic population. 
 
 
 
 
 
The majority of the Muslim Bangsamoro of the southern Philippines are represented by 
two main political and paramilitary groups the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) 
and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). The common aim of both groups would 
be to have autonomy and to live according to Sharia law. However as  Vitug & Gloria 
(2000) point out this promotes a conflict of interest, because Philippine law has the 
Constitution as its authority and the Philippine Constitution ‘still hovers above the  
Koran’.   
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Whilst the MILF have been engaging in official peace talks with the Government of the 
Republic of the Philippines (GRP) since March 2003, the MNLF has not been as 
fortunate. Although the GRP signed the historic 1996 Peace Agreement with the MNLF 
most of the conditions have not been implemented, and  this in turn has led to unrest 
with the Muslim Bangsamoro who are represented by the MNLF.  
 
Brief History of Islam in the Southern Philippines 
 
The history and struggle for survival of Islam in the southern Philippines can be 
chronologically placed into four eras. They are (1) 1450 (establishment of Sulu 
Sultanate) to 1764 (end of the Moro Wars), (2) 1764 to 1898 (end of Spanish 
colonialism), (3) 1898 to 1946 (Philippine independence), and (4) 1946 to the present 
time. 
 
(1) According to Lingga (2004) the exact arrival date of Islam in the Philippines is 
difficult to determine. However it is now widely accepted that the first Sultanate in Sulu 
was established in 1450, and by the time the Portuguese navigator Ferdinand Magellan 
(who was commissioned by Spain) visited the Philippines in 1521, there had been four 
Sultans in Sulu (Local Government Unit: Province of Sulu, 2005). As well by 1521 
Islam was being practised in vast areas of the entire Philippines. Nevertheless Spain 
believed its duty lay in proselytising the population of the Philippines to Christianity. 
This course of action inevitably led to hostilities with the local Muslim population: the 
first being near Cebu (an island in the Visayas group, equidistant between Luzon and 
Mindanao) in 1569. 
  
The armed conflicts between the Spanish colonialists and the Muslim Bangsamoro in 
the Philippines from 1569 to 1764 were known as the Moro Wars. Throughout the 17th 
Century the Muslims in the southern Philippines were successful in repelling Spanish 
attacks, and even captured the Spanish fort in Zamboanga in 1662.  In 1764 British 
forces were in occupation in Manila, and because Spain was pre-occupied with the 
eviction of British troops from the Philippines a decline in hostilities with the Muslim 
Bangsamoro population occurred: officially ending the period known as the Moro Wars.  
 
(2) From 1764 to 1898 the Muslim Bangsamoro and the Spanish colonialists continued 
fighting however not with the intensity which occurred in the Moro Wars. Nevertheless 
there were some notable exceptions such as the overwhelming defeat of the Muslim 
Bangsamoro on the island of Bohol in the Visayas on 31 August 1829 by the Spanish 
commander Manual Sanz (Zaide 1941).  
 
(3) In 1898 as part of the terms of the Treaty of Paris the United States of America was 
given control of the Philippines. From 1899 to 1913 the American colonialists 
conducted a series of military campaigns against the Muslim Bangsamoro in Mindanao 
including the infamous massacre at Bud Dajo on March 5-7, 1906 in which over 900 
men women and children were massacred, and the battle of Bud Bagsak on June 11-
16, 1913 in which over 2000 Muslim Bangsamoro were killed including 196 women and 
340 children (Kho 1998).  In contrast the Muslim Bangsamoro of Sulu Archipelago 
fared a little better and were able to live according to their beliefs in return for 
recognizing United States sovereignty (Salamanca 1984). However, overall the 
influence of the Muslim Bangsamoro in the southern Philippines was being eroded by a 
massive inflow of Christian settlers under government resettlement programs such as 
the Inter-island Migration Division of the Bureau of Labour of 1920, the Quirino-Recto 
Colonization Act of 1935, and the National Land Settlement Administration of 1939 
(Gutierrez & Borras, Jr., 2003)   
 
This massive inflow of predominately Philippine Christians from Luzon and the Visayas 
to the southern Philippines was only stalled by the Japanese occupation of the 
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Philippines in 1941. It is interesting to note that during the time of the Japanese 
occupation, an alliance developed between Muslim Bangsamoro and Christians to fight 
the common enemy (Midori 1999). However this mutually beneficial alliance ended 
when the United States granted independence to the Philippines in 1946. 
 
(4) From 1946 to the present time the Muslim Bangsamoro in the southern Philippines 
have been subjected to displacement, broken promises, failed peace treaties, and all-
out war.  Nevertheless the Muslim Bangsamoro have had a number of allies including 
the Organisation of Islamic Council (OIC) which has thrown its support behind the 
Muslim Bangsamoro quest for self-determination (Iribani 2003).  
 
In a gesture of reconciliation, the then President of the Republic of the Philippines, 
Corazon Aquino established the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) in 
1989. The formation of the ARMM was designed to give a degree of autonomy to the 
Muslim Bangsamoro in the southern Philippines. Nur Misuari, a former chairman of the 
ARMM has now described the ARMM as a “lousy form of autonomy” because when he 
was Governor of the ARMM he claimed the Philippine Government sabotaged his 
administration by not releasing money for specific projects (Arnado 2005). The ARMM 
originally consisted of Lanao del Sur, Magindanao, Tawi-Tawi, and Sulu. In September 
2001 the province of Basilan and Marawi City were added.   
 
 
Formation of the MNLF 
 
 
On March 18 1968, dozens of young Muslim Filipino army recruits on Corregidor Island 
in Luzon were killed by fellow army personnel acting under orders from their superior 
officers. The slain army recruits had refused to fight fellow Muslims in Sabah (Northern 
Borneo). This murderous event became known as the Jabidah massacre, and was the 
catalyst for the formation of the MNLF. It is interesting to speculate whether the MNLF 
would have ever have come into existence had the officers who gave the order to shoot 
the young recruits been made accountable for their actions. In what appeared to be a 
mockery of justice the Commanding Officer at the time of the Jabidah massacre, 
Nueva Ecija, who although court-martialed in a trial, was only transferred (Vitag & 
Gloria 2000). 
 
The exact date of official formation of the MNLF is open to interpretation. Che Man 
(1990) suggests it was 1969. However its original founder and Chairman (still current), 
Nur Misuari3 claims it was 1968 (Arnado 2005). Although the MNLF was the original 
organisation representing the Muslim Bangsamoro in the southern Philippines the 
breakaway MILF has by far the larger following. Rudy Rodil, Professor of History, 
Mindanao State University, and a member of the GRP peace negotiating panel 
involved in all the current GRP/MILF Exploratory Talks agrees with this assertion and 
claimed in 2005 that the MILF enjoyed the overwhelming popular support of the 
majority of the Muslim Bangsamoro, in Mindanao (Rodil as cited in East 2005). 
However be that as it may the MNLF still enjoys majority support in the Islands of the 
Sulu Archipelago, especially the island of Sulu which out of a population of 620 
thousand in 2000 had 591 thousand followers of the Islamic faith (National Statistical 
Office, 2000).    
 
                                                 
3 Nur Misuari was born in Jolo, Sulu in 1942. In 1958 he left Jolo to attend university. When Marcos 
declared martial law in 1972 he was a lecturer at the University of the Philippines. He was elected the first 
Governor of the ARMM. Misuari still has the respect of the majority of the Muslim Bangsamoro in the Sulu 
Archipelago, especially the Province of Sulu.  
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MNLF Pre 1996 
 
 
In the early 1970s during the presidency of Ferdinand Marcos, and possibly in 
response to the MNLF becoming a paramilitary organisation some Philippine Christians 
in the southern Philippine who may have felt under threat from the Muslim Bangsamoro 
quest for self-determination participated in massacres of Muslims at Upi, Ampatuan, 
Manili, and Buldun. And after seventy Muslims were massacred in a mosque in Manili 
in June 1971 foreign players came onto the scene (McKenna 1998).  In the United 
Nations, Libyan President Muammar al-Qaddafi accused the Philippine government of 
genocide, and threatened to give aid to the Philippine Muslims (McKenna 1998). With 
international attention now being given to the plight of the Muslim Bangsamoro in the 
southern Philippines, Marcos’ authority was seen to be questioned. Accordingly in 
September 1972 Marcos imposed martial law citing Muslim secessionists as one of the 
two biggest threats to national security: the other threat Marcos perceived was from the 
New People’s Army (NPA), which was the newest version of the Communist Party of 
the Philippines (Quimpo 2000). It is just possible that Marcos was trying to gain tacit 
approval from the USA for his anti-Muslim stance by including the NPA in his “enemy 
list”. After all this was at the height of the Cold War. Interestingly enough Marcos did 
not mention the Hukbalahap (Huk); possibly he assumed they no longer posed a viable 
threat. This communist-led guerrilla movement had been active in the Philippines since 
the Japanese occupation. Marcos launched military campaigns against the Huk in 1969 
and by the time martial law was lifted on 17 January 1981 most Huk military activities 
had ceased.   
 
In 1976, four years after the imposition of martial law, Marcos, finding opposition from 
some of his Muslim Asian neighbours and also from the Organisation of Islamic 
Conference (OIC), who had in July 1975 given formal recognition to the MNLF, 
embarked on a bold adventure to regain some respectability. Marcos reluctantly agreed 
to negotiate with representatives of the MNLF, and have representatives of the OIC act 
as interlocutors and conciliators. Accordingly, he met with the representatives of the 
MNLF and the OIC in Tripoli, Libya in the latter part of 1976 and negotiated a peace 
agreement: (The Tripoli Peace Agreement). 
 
The peace agreement which was signed in Tripoli on December 1976 recommended 
that full autonomy be granted to thirteen southern Philippine provinces mainly in the 
north-west and south-west of Mindanao. Sharia law was to be allowed in the courts, 
and Muslim schools, colleges, and universities were to be established. As well an 
Executive Council for Muslims was to participate in the Philippine Central Government. 
It seemed at last that the Muslim Bangsamoro of the southern Philippines had the 
degree of autonomy for which they had been actively pursuing. However to implement 
these radical changes Marcos insisted that it be ratified by a plebiscite: something 
which Marcos had not stipulated at the negotiations in Tripoli (Che Man 1990). As 
expected the plebiscite failed: after all the Muslims of the Philippines only represented 
approximately 20% of the population of Mindanao. Accordingly, the cease-fire 
collapsed and all out hostilities recommenced between the MNLF paramilitary and the 
Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP). As well, because the Tripoli Peace Agreement 
had failed to materalise many Muslim Bangsamoro placed the blame with the MNLF 
Chairman, Nur Misuari. This, not surprisingly, led to tensions arising between Nur 
Misuari and the MNLF Vice-Chairman, Hashim Salamat (McKenna 1998), and in turn 
saw the formation in 1984 of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) with Salamat 
being its chairman. The MILF now became the second paramilitary group which had 
Islam as its official ideology (East 2005). 
 
1985 and 1986 saw political turmoil in the Philippines which resulted in the collapse of 
the Marcos regime and Corazon Aquino assuming the Presidency. One of Aquino’s 
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first priorities apart from trying to stabilize governance was to find a solution to the 
“Muslim” problem in the southern Philippines. Advice was sought from the OIC and the 
MNLF. Understandably only the MNLF was approached, after all the MILF had only 
been in existence less than two years. Although in hindsight had the MILF been 
approached as well as the MNLF then the tension which existed between the two 
groups at that time may have been relaxed. After all the OIC was asked to be involved 
and no doubt there would have been members of the OIC who would have had the 
respect of the MNLF and the MILF. And no doubt that respect would have been 
reciprocal. However be that as it may, the MNLF was the only Muslim Bangsamoro 
group consulted and the only one to attend the peace talks held in Jeddah, Saudi 
Arabia in 1987. 
 
The “Jeddah Accord” as it was known was radical in the extreme. It proposed full 
autonomy for all of Mindanao as well as Basilan, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi and Palawan 
(Complex Power Sharing, 2001). Although the Muslim Bangsamoro would have been 
enthusiastic at the prospect of full autonomy for the southern Philippines the Christian 
majority, as was the case in the 1976 Tripoli Agreement, would not have been as 
enthusiastic at the prospect of living under Sharia Law. However this was not the 
catalyst for renewed hostilities. In all probability it was the Aquino administration’s 
failure to include the now highly organised MILF in the peace agreement. As a result 
fighting erupted between the MILF and the AFP, resulting in capital buildings and 
bridges being burnt, and police and army garrisons attacked (McKenna 1998). 
 
By 1990, the MNLF forces were estimated to have been reduced to approximately 
13,000 men with 8000 weapons (Vitag & Gloria, 2000). The MNLF were honouring 
their agreement with the Aquino Administration and according to Vitag and Gloria 
(2000), by 1990 only scattered skirmishes with the AFP were occurring. The MNLF had 
managed to abide by article (6) in the “Jeddah Accord” which stated “The Philippine 
panel agreed to exercise its best efforts to provide a secure and peaceful atmosphere 
to enable the MNLF to undertake consultations with the component peoples in the 
proposed area of autonomy” (Complex Power Sharing, 2001). (The MNLF were 
pacified whereas the MILF were becoming more aggressive: a situation which would 
reverse in a little over five years).   
 
In the 1992 elections Fidel Valdez Ramos was elected President of the Republic of the 
Philippines. He promised the MNLF he would move closer to the 1976 Tripoli 
agreement (McKenna, 2004). In 2001, when reflecting on his time as President, Ramos 
wrote ‘we consciously nurtured the atmosphere of peace and development, for it is the 
only way to make sustainable progress happen’. With this statement in mind it may 
explain why Ramos originally decided to negotiate with the MNLF in lieu of the more 
militant MILF.  And from 1992 to 1996 Ramos continued dialogue with the MNLF and 
finally reached consensus on a number of areas including the establishment of 
Shari’ah courts, distribution of wealth from mines and mineral resources and a 
comprehensive administrative system, all of which were proposed in the 1976 Tripoli 
Agreement, but not followed up (East 2005). The agreement which was signed by the 
MNLF and the GRP in 1996 was referred to as the “1996 Peace Agreement”. This was 
the last official agreement signed by the MNLF and to date is still the only peace 
agreement which the MNLF acknowledges. In 2001,Ramos said of the 1996 
agreement, “we laid the foundations for a genuine and lasting peace in Mindanao, and I 
consider the historic agreement the government signed in September 1996 with the 
Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) as one of the major achievements of my 
administration” (p. 266). 
 
 
MNLF Post 1996 
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In the Presidential elections of 1998, a “B grade film actor”, Joseph Estrada was 
elected President of the Republic of the Philippines. Responding to the MILF’s call for 
discussions on Muslim Bangsamoro independency in the Southern Philippines, Estrada 
is reported as replying ‘over my dead body’, and ‘if they want war, I’ll give them war’ 
Vitag & Gloria 2000). Notwithstanding this provocative statement Estrada eventually 
did start formal talks with the MILF in October 1999. However they led to nothing 
because he was replaced by his deputy Gloria Macapagal Arroyo in April 2001 after 
facing charges of corruption. Having assumed the presidency in a time of national 
upheaval, Arroyo wanted stability in the Philippines, and especially the Muslim areas of 
Mindanao. The terrorist events of September 2001 in the United States of America 
which were blamed on Muslim extremism made dialogue with the Muslim Bangsamoro 
more urgent because the Bush administration had now included the MILF and the 
fledging Abu Sayyaf (a loosely organised band of extremist Philippine Muslims) now 
part of the “War on Terror” (Kho 2002). Interestingly the MNLF were excluded from 
Bush’s list of terrorist organisations. This may very well have been because the MILF 
and the Abu Sayyaf were engaged in hostilities with the AFP whilst the MNLF were still 
observing the cease-fire agreements outlined with the GRP in the 1996 Peace 
Agreement. However more than likely it was because the OIC still gave official 
recognition to the MNLF. And it must be remembered that the majority of the members 
of the OIC had publicly condemned the actions of the militant Muslims responsible for 
the USA attacks. Eventually the MILF was given “non terrorist status” after a visit to the 
U.S. by the Philippine President. Gloria Arroyo (Rogers 2004).  
 
From 2001 to 2004 the MNLF was being virtually ignored by the Arroyo Administration 
possibly because they were experiencing internal problems. Internal bickering saw the 
MNLF divide into two groups, with one group remaining loyal to Nur Misuari and the 
other group giving loyalty to Parouk Hussin who was then Governor of the ARMM. 
Eventually the MNLF did heal its internal division, and in February 2006 re-installed 
Misuari as its chairman (Jacinto 2006). However during the time of the MNLF division 
the GRP and the MILF had opened up dialogue in the form of the GRP/MILF 
Exploratory Talks which started in March 2003 and are continuing to the present time.  
 
Why the Arroyo administration decided to open up official dialogue with the MILF 
exclusively and not include the MNLF in some capacity is puzzling. Was it because the 
U.S.A was convinced by President Arroyo during a visit there in 2003 to remove the 
MILF from the list of terrorist organizations targeted in the “War on Terror”? This was 
certainly a factor. However more than likely it may have been because in May 2003 the 
United states Institute of Peace, (USIP) under directions from Deputy Secretary of 
State, Richard Armitage announced that in collaboration with the Malaysian 
Government it would facilitate future peace negotiations between the GRP and the 
MILF exclusively. (USIP 2005). Whatever the reason the USIP and the GRP had for 
excluding the MNLF from these official talks is unclear. What is clear is that the MNLF 
was excluded from these official talks and to date still is.  
 
It is true that the MILF does represent more Muslim Bangsamoro than does the MNLF. 
However one argument for the MNLF to be included in the current GRP/MILF 
Exploratory Talks is that the MNLF, as mentioned, has official recognition from the OIC 
and is now a permanent observer in the OIC: something which the GRP is trying to 
achieve (Romero 2006). The MNLF inclusion may be seen as just too embarrassing for 
inclusion in these talks, after all the chairman of the MNLF, Nur Misuari, is being 
detained on rebellion charges and has yet to be bought before the court. As well there 
is still considerable violence in Sulu (the MNLF stronghold), and Misuari is a native of 
Sulu. Added to this is the call from the OIC for the release of Misuari indicating that it 
could help the overall peace process. The Philippine Justice Secretary, Raul Gonzales 
has indicated that it is impossible for President Arroyo to release Misuari because the 
courts have jurisdiction over him (Romero 2006): the separation of powers in the 
Republic of the Philippines is still observed. However if Misuari is tried and found “not 
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guilty” on the rebellion charges he may be able to convince the GRP to include the 
MNLF in the current exploratory talks. Misuari’s inclusion in the current exploratory 
talks would be advantageous. He has in his words been ‘probably the only 
revolutionary leader in the world who has negotiated with almost all administrations of 
the Philippine government since the time of Marcos for the sake of peace’ (Misuari as 
cited in Arnado, 2006), and Misuari is reported as being prepared to try to settle the 
differences between the MILF and MNLF (Arnado 2006). An indication of this 
happening in the near future was the statement issued by the head of the MILF Central 
Committee Secretariat, Muhammad Ameen. In May 2006, Ameen is reported as saying 
that the closure of the 1996 Peace Agreement with the MNLF would hasten the pace of 
the current GRP/MILF Exploratory Talks. Ameen was also quoted as saying ‘our 
brothers in the MNLF are absolutely right in demanding for the full implementation of 
this accord and we understand their predicament’ (luwaran.com 21 May 2006).      
 
Although the MNLF is currently excluded in the USIP initiated talks there are other 
promising signs that they may in the near future be included in some capacity. On 08 
June 2005 representatives of the GRP and the MNLF met to discuss the status of the 
1996 Peace Agreement. It was agreed at this meeting to form a Technical Working 
Group (TWG) to discuss among other issues, security, and the continued detainment of 
Nur Misuari (Conflict Resolution 2006). The TWG has met on a number of occasions 
since June 2005 and in August 2005 the GRP-MNLF Peace Working Group (PWG) 
was formed. In January 2006 in Jolo, Sulu, 100 people, including members of the AFP, 
Philippine National Police, MNLF members and people from the Sulu Provincial 
Government met to officially inaugurate the GRP-MNLF PWG (Conflict Resolution 
2005). And in what must be seen as international acceptance, or at the very least 
interest in the MNLF desire for peace, the former NATO Deputy Supreme Commander, 
British General (ret) Sir Rupert Smith, addressed a meeting of the GRP-MLNF PWG in 
Sulu in March 2006 advocating that the all sides must endeavour to strive for mutual 
understanding and tolerance of views (Conflict Resolution 2006). 
 
 
Analysis 
 
 
Although the MNLF has been in existence since 1968, whilst the MILF was only formed 
in 1984, the Arroyo Administration has seen fit to only open up official internationally 
accepted peace talks with the MILF. Whilst it is true that the GRP-MNLF PWG is 
making some progress in the peace process it has to assumed that this dialogue will 
“grind on” if not falter in the event that the MNLF’s Chairman, Nur Misuari is convicted 
and jailed on rebellion charges. Therefore the hope of a sustainable peace, especially 
in Sulu, is pivotal on the fate and future of Misuari. For without his guidance and 
leadership of the members and paramilitary of the MNLF there would be a void which 
would be hard to fill. Whether the Arroyo Administration knows or acknowledges this 
fact is problematic.  
 
 
It would appear from their actions so far, apart from a little “window dressing” such as 
the acceptance of the role of the GRP-MNLF PWG, that it is easier to negotiate with 
the more popular MILF than to address the more complex issue of acceptance of the 
MNLF’s right to represent a minority Muslim Bangsamoro. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
History will judge the Arroyo Administration harshly and future peace agreements with 
successive Philippine Administrations will be hard to enforce if the MNLF is denied 
access to the current GRP/MILF Exploratory Peace Talks. Crucial to the success of 
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these talks is the acceptance and full implementation of the MNLF/GRP 1996 Peace 
Agreement. Additionally, giving the MNLF equal acceptance as a representative of the 
Muslim Bangsamoro, as the MILF now enjoys, is one way to ensure that all sides of the 
Muslim Bangsamoro debate are presented.          
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